Did History Actually Teach Us Anything? – Episode 4: King's Cross Fire 1987

Laura: 
Welcome to "Did History Actually Teach Us Anything?" 
The podcast where we unravel the most well-known tales of calamity, mishap, and unforeseen consequences that have shaped the course of history. And consider whether we've actually learned anything from them all these years later... 
In this podcast, we examine the historical events that you may think you know about already and the causes that led to them, be they icebergs or bakers ovens. 
We will consider whether these tragedies could have been avoided, and some of the surprising things we do differently now as a result. 
But this podcast, isn't just about dates and events. It's about learning from the past, drawing insights from hindsight, and gaining a deeper appreciation for the complexities of what really happened in these events we think we know so well. 
So get ready to encounter remarkable individuals, pivotal moments and fascinating insights that will make you appreciate health and safety and environmental management as far more than just red tape. 
A discarded match falling through a small gap on a wooden escalator sparked a catastrophic blaze, which claimed the lives of 31 individuals. These are the tragic events that unfolded during the King's Cross station fire on November the 18th 1987.
Join us as we learn about the immediate impacts of the fire, the heroic efforts of the firefighters, and the lasting changes in safety protocols as a result of this tragic incident. 
We're going to begin with a brief history of King's Cross station and the London underground from our health and safety expert, Kevin. 


Kevin: 
The King's Cross name was derived from a statue of King George IV which had been erected at the crossroads outside the mainline station. The statue was completed in 1836 but demolished again in 1845. However, the name had stuck and the area continues to be known as King's Cross to this day. 
The Underground Railway first opened at King's Cross in 1863 when the Metropolitan line was built between Farringdon and Paddington and this allowed the linking of the Great Northern Railway at King's Cross.
Many of the first underground stations had to be built to enable locomotive smoke to disperse, as the original underground trains were gas lit wooden carriages hauled by steam locomotives. They were subsurface lines built by digging trenches for the tracks and then covering them over again.
By 1870, it was possible to safely dig deeper tunnels under London, but it wasn't until the 1880s that safe lifts and electric power had been perfected to make the digging of deeper underground lines practical. 
In 1906, the Great Northern, Piccadilly and Brompton Railways, which runs between Finsbury Park and Hammersmith, now part of the Piccadilly line, arrived at King's Cross. 
In 1907, a separate station was opened to accommodate a second underground railway, the City and South London Railway, now the City branch of the Northern line. . The first escalators were installed at Earl's Court in 1911 with escalators at King's Cross being installed in the 1930s. 
The escalators were made from wooden slats with rubber handrails. 
In 1968, the Victoria Line was linked to King's Cross, adding another below ground level to the station. King's Cross became a significant transport hub, with intercity, suburban and underground services. 
In 1987, it was the busiest underground station on the network, with an average daily passenger tally of 250, 000 people using the station, facilities, and an additional 100, 000 passing through at peak periods.
King's Cross Underground Station is unique, in that it is built on five distinct levels below ground, connected by passageways, staircases and escalators. 
The Ticket Hall is over four metres below street level, with the Metropolitan and Circle Line platforms at seven metres, the Victoria Line platforms at over 15 metres, the Piccadilly Line platforms at over 21 metres , and the Northern Line platforms at 27 metres below street level. 
The Piccadilly Line escalators were installed in 1939, inclined at an angle of 30 degrees and rising over 17 metres from the platform to the ticket hall. 



Laura: 
So Kevin, can you talk us through the timeline of the disaster? 



Kevin: 
19:29 hours Wednesday, 18th of November 1987: 
The evening rush hour had passed uneventfully with the usual 100, 000 or so passengers passing through. 
However, a passenger on one of four escalators travelling up from the Piccadilly line platforms has noticed a small fire underneath one of the steps and has reported it at the ticket office, having completed their journey up to the ticket hall.
This information is then passed on to the relief station inspector by telephone. The fire is between 15 and 20 meters below street level.

19:30 hours: 
A second passenger has spotted smoke and a glow underneath a step of the escalator and has pressed the emergency stop button. Several station staff and several police constables currently in the underground station have observed the stopping of the escalator and have gone to investigate.
The relief station inspector has unfortunately been given incorrect information and has gone to inspect a different escalator from one of the other underground lines.

19:32 hours: 
Having investigated and confirmed the presence of fire, one of the police constables decides to phone headquarters and asks for the London Fire Brigade to be called. However, as their radio doesn't work underground, they must travel up to street level to make that call. 
They then wait at street level for the Fire Brigade to arrive, so they can direct them to the fire.

19:35 to 19:41 hours: 
The relief station inspector has arrived at the Piccadilly line escalators and has checked the lower machine room but cannot find any evidence of fire. 
Other station staff direct the public onto alternative escalators and block access to the Piccadilly line escalators to prevent anyone else from accessing them.
The relief station inspector checks the upper machine room going down the stairs alongside escalator 5 and can now see the smoke and flames beneath escalator 4, but is unable to get close enough to the fire to use the carbon dioxide extinguisher they have with them. 
They have forgotten about the water fog equipment installed for putting out small fires so it isn't deployed.
Calls are made to request that Piccadilly and Victoria Line trains do not stop at King's Cross until it is safe for them to do so, and that no further tickets are sold to passengers wanting to travel to King's Cross. 

19:42 hours: 
An eastbound Piccadilly line train stops at King's Cross and 50 or more passengers alight.
Although the fire is small to begin with, it becomes more serious very quickly. The flames heat the framework and decking of the wooden escalator, which then bursts into flames. Station staff are evacuated from the booking office. 
But no one checks the Bureau de Change or public lavatories to ensure anyone in these locations is also evacuated. 

19:43 to 19:48 hours: 
A westbound train stops, letting passengers out. Northern line trains continue to stop at the station until 19:48. Very quickly, the ticket hall becomes engulfed in thick black smoke and heat intense enough to melt the paint on the ceiling cracks the concrete and strips the tiles from the walls.
Fire engines are now in attendance, and an ambulance is requested because people are still exiting the underground platforms. Flashover occurs, sending a fireball of flame around head height at a speed of over 2, 500 km per second into the ticket hall. 
This engulfs everyone in its path and the heat of around 600 degrees Celsius stops the clock at the head of the Piccadilly Line escalators. 
A major incident emergency message is sent to the British Transport Police HQ.
Three Victoria Line trains, still using the relevant Victoria Line platforms, are used to evacuate any remaining passengers underground from the station. The last remaining passengers have been cleared by 19:55 hours.

19:59 to 01:46 hours on the 19th of November: 
The first ambulance arrives. The fire has finally been contained, but search and salvage operations continue through the remainder of the night. 


Laura: 
Was the disaster handled well? 


Kevin: 
It was decided not to use the public address system to warn passengers of the fire because of the risk of panic. Communications underground were difficult and caused confusion and delays in response. Emergency plans were hampered by the difficulty of access to the fire and communication problems. 
In total, 35 fire crews with more than 150 firefighters and 14 ambulances were involved in the emergency response. But 31 people died, including a senior firefighter. And over 100 people were seriously injured. 
In the investigation that followed, it was established that a lit match was dropped on the escalator and it fell through a gap into the void below where it set a light to accumulated grease and litter. 
It was the worst fatal fire ever seen on the London Underground and led to a public inquiry led by Desmond Fennell (OBEQC) that we will consider in more detail later. 


Laura: 
Is there any way the fire could have been avoided? 


Kevin: 
Fires were common on the London Underground. So much so that they were nicknamed smolderings, but they usually went out quickly, either of their own accord or when the escalators were cleaned. There had been around 400 such smoldering since 1956 without any fatalities. So why was this fire different from all those others?
The escalator was made of wood and cleaning was not carried out often because of the need to stop the operation of the escalator completely during the process and of the risk of corrosion to the metal parts of the escalator system from using the water fog equipment provided. 
Other cleaning methods were laborious and risked damage to the inner workings of the escalator by penetration of cleaning solvents. Difficulties in cleaning away the grease used to facilitate smooth operation and collected debris in the voids underneath the steps meant there was plenty of available fuel for the fire.
In fact, during the subsequent investigation, the lift and escalator maintenance manager said that they didn't believe the running tracks of the escalator had ever been completely cleaned since their installation in 1939. 
The underground station was on multiple levels, with many passageways and tunnels, with a free flow of air around for the comfort of passengers and train lines exiting at all levels, all of which were able to supply an endless amount of oxygen to the fire. 
The underground trains that continued to access the underground platforms may have pushed additional air through the system during the incident.
The lit match dropped onto the escalator provided the ignition source for this fire. Smoking had been banned on the underground since the Oxford Circus fire in November 1984, where 1, 000 passengers were trapped underground in smoke filled tunnels for three hours. But, because of inadequate enforcement, the practice had continued.
In 1987 it was widespread practice for people to light matches as they travelled up from the platforms to the ticket hall on their way out of the station. The risk of fire from a discarded cigarette was well known as exemplified by the Bradford City Valley Parade disaster in May 1985, which claimed the lives of 56 supporters and injured around 265 more. 
The fire, starting in the seating area, quickly spread to engulf the whole of the stand. If the smoking ban had been enforced, then the King's Cross fire on the 18th of November 1987 would not have happened.


Laura: 
Well could the outcome of the fire have been any different? 


Kevin: 
There were several communication issues and errors during the emergency.
The public address system was not used to warn the public of the problems and issued direct instructions to them about safe exit routes from the station. 
Radio communications underground did not work properly, so separate groups of staff were working at cross purposes to each other and giving countermanding instructions. 
The delay in relying instructions to train companies meant that train drivers were still accessing the platforms and disembarking passengers during the emergency. They were, however, able to transport passengers back out of harm's way again when it became impossible to evacuate them any other way. 
Fire Brigade and London Underground staff were unable to communicate with each other and coordinate rescue efforts.
Most importantly, the delay in responding to the initial reports of fire And the chain of command in place meant that the fire was able to gain considerable hold before the fire brigade were on site, and must have contributed to the severity of the damage caused and the loss of life incurred.
Mistakes made by London Underground staff also played a part in the outcome of the fire. The relief station inspector took the wrong fire extinguisher with them when investigating the fire originally and then failed to deploy the water fog equipment. 
The subsequent inquiry concluded that this may have delayed the fire sufficiently enough to enable the fire brigade to tackle the fire before flashover occurred. 


Laura: 
So what were the recommendations of the Fennel Inquiry? 


Kevin: 
There were 157 recommendations founded through the Public Inquiry, the Fennel Inquiry Report, published in 1988. The key recommendations were:
to replace wooden escalators; 
to install heat and smoke detectors; 
to extend the smoking ban to all station areas; 
to ensure that radio equipment used by British Transport Police was compatible with that used by the Fire Brigade;
to review the Fire Brigade's personal protective equipment; 
to improve the Fire Brigade's communications between firefighters below ground; 
to ensure up to date station plans are kept outside all stations in locations agreed with the Fire Brigade; 
to review fire safety training and policy for station staff;
and to commence a programme of proper cleaning and inspection of escalators. 


Laura: 
So how could modern fire safety systems have changed the outcome of the King's Cross fire? 


Kevin: 
One of the key findings of the Fennel Inquiry was that the management culture at London Underground at the time of the fire was a large contributor to the chaos and confusion that took place during the emergency and their unwillingness to bring in outside help until it was too late. 
Not only this, but no one single person had overall responsibility for safety within the organisation. Even more worrying was the fact that the two directors of the safety and personnel functions were only concerned with the safety of London Underground staff. The safety of passengers was not part of their job.
If we consider Network Rail, currently, their safety mission statement is "Everyone home safely", which includes passengers and members of the public. But this was clearly lacking in 1987. 
The London Fire Brigade had previously raised concerns about the complacency of London Underground Management and the lack of training provided to staff on emergency procedures.
They had asked to be immediately informed of any fire on the Underground Railway, but this advice was not followed. The inquiry proposed a new proactive approach to safety management. But interestingly, this had already been proposed by the London Underground Senior Personnel Manager of Operations a few months before the fire.
What was clearly missing at the time of the fire was a system to conduct safety audits and learn from the results, as well as adequate training in emergency responses and evacuation for London Underground staff. 
Even if adequate heat and smoke detectors had been in place London Underground staff would have been ill equipped to deal with the emergency in anything other than the uncoordinated and haphazard way they did. 


Laura: 
So what lessons did we learn from the fire, and how did that impact any future fires at King's Cross station? 


Kevin: 
The investigation that took place after the fire spent time and resources trying to recreate the effects of the fire, including building models of the underground station and platforms, and this enabled a deeper understanding of how flashover could occur. 
Although only around one quarter of the Fennel Inquiry recommendations were implemented, and some of them not until many years after the fire, there was a programme of escalator replacements, and a widening and enforcement of the smoking ban very quickly underway after its publication.
The Fire Precautions Subsurface Railway Stations Regulations 1989 ban smoking at all stations and escalators. These regulations are still in place and were updated in 2009. The regulations also stipulate periodic fire drills and fire safety training for all station staff. 
There is also now a specific fire safety risk assessment document available, tailored for the needs of transport premises and facilities and designed by the Department for Communities and Local Government Publications.
All wooden escalators are gradually replaced by metal ones, although the last wooden escalator at Greenford wasn't replaced until 2014. 
Heat detectors and sprinkler systems were fitted underneath the escalators. 
Developments have also taken place in the cleaning of escalators. While this process used to require a team of people with brushes, cloths and vacuums, there is now a machine that can walk up the escalator, even whilst it's moving, spraying a cleaning agent on each step and riser, and brushes to agitate the fluid into the treads, and the resulting suspension is then automatically vacuumed away. 
A new radio system was installed to improve communications underground, and that was updated again by the Airwave system, which was in place at the time of the 7/7 London underground bombings in 2005.
Cooperation and communication between the London Fire Brigade and London Underground has been improved, with many joint training exercises taking place and successful joint involvement in further major incidents since the King's Cross fire. 
For the firefighters themselves, there were improvements in equipment, such as replacing their yellow plastic overalls, which melted in heat, and were referred to as boil in the bag suits by the firefighters themselves, and rubber gloves that hampered movement and provided no protection from heat.
Fire and Rescue Services in the UK now work closely with those involved in design, construction and operation of railways to ensure that all relevant hazards and risks are evaluated and controlled, including working with station staff during an operational incident. 
King's Cross station itself was rebuilt with passenger flow and safety in mind.
Since 2002, £2.5 billion has been invested in order to improve access and facilities to the underground. In 2000, a new company, Transport for London, was set up to create one integrated transport body for London. 
Transport for London provides a range of fire safety and management system guidance documents underpinned by a system of standards to ensure that all stations remain compliant with Fire Precautions Subsurface Railway Stations England Regulations 2009.
The Rail Industry Fire Association was formed in 1996, following the privatisation of the railways in 1995, to take on the industry wide responsibility for fire safety and to maintain fire safety standards throughout the industry.
British Transport Police have been involved in many subsequent major incidents and have been able to learn and improve their response because of each one, including their collaborations with other emergency services. 
It's comforting to know that because of the Fennel Inquiry and the subsequent improvements in fire safety, there haven't been any fatal underground fires since.



Laura: 
Thanks for joining us on this episode of "Did History Actually Teach Us Anything?" If you enjoyed this episode, please follow our social media channels, leave us a rating and review, and share our podcast with anyone who wants to learn more about the risky side of history. 
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